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GLADYS D.SMITH, Appellant, v~ IRA- V. SMITH; . 
. Respondent. . 
[1] Divorce-Disposition of Propefty-Eft'ect of Agreement of 
Parties.-Where interlocutory divorce decree purported to ap-
prove entire property settlement of parties, in which wife 
waived all right to any payments for support and maintenance, 
but court awarded her nominal alimony in accordance with 
her request, the decree may only be interpreted. as approv-
ing that part of the agreement dividing the ~roperty and 
not as approving the waiver of alimony. 
[2] Id.-Disposition of Propefty-Eft'ect of Agreement of Parties. 
-Where an interlocutory divorce decree purporting to ap-
prove a property settIem(!nt agreement in its entirety has 
become final, and husband, in a proceeaingfor modification of 
such decree, seeks collaterally to attack the provision award-
[1] See 5 Oal.J'ur. lO-Yr.Supp. (1944 Rev.), Divorce and Sep-
aration, § 180 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4] Divorce, § 223; [3] Divorce, 
§219; [5] Divorce, §§72(2), 204; [6] JUdgments, §328(2);[7] 
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ing alimony, the question is not whether the trial court emd' 
in granting relief inconsistent . with the property settlement' 
agreement but only whether it had jurisdiction to do so. 
I 
(8] ld.-Disposition of Properly-Jurisdiction.-Where the prop.: 
erty rights of the parties are put in issue, the court ina: 
divorce action has jurisdiction to determine them.'· 
(4] ld.-Disposition of Properly--Bf[ect of Agreement of Part.lea. ' 
-The court in a divorce action has jurisdiction to determine ' 
whether a property settlement agreement is equitable and 
should be enforced, and to award alimony in a proper ~·.'l 
(Civ. Code, § 139.)., , ""tJlt 
(6] Id.-Pleading-Property Rights and Alimony.~estiODl" 
to whether a property settlement agreement is equitable and 
should be enforced in a divorce action and whether ,wife 
is entitled to alimony are raised by her pleadings asking that' 
approval be withheld from the provision of such agreement 
respecting alimony, thereby in eifect attacking the validity 
of that agreement; by her request that the remaining provi-; 
sions be approved, this being tantamount to a claim that she ': 
is entitled in any event to the property the agreement pr0-
vides she should have; and by a prayer for nominal alimony; 
this in eifect asking the court to exercise its power to reserve 
jurisdiction to award substantial alimony in the future if 
changed circumstances should justify it. 
[6] ludgments - Oollateral Attack - Insu1Iiciency of PleadJnr.;...L 
'The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action does 
not render a default judgment vulnerable ,to conateral", ,., ~,','" 
' tack; it is sufficient if it apprises defendant of the nature 
. of plaintiff's demand. ,,:. 
[7] Divorce-Permanent :AlimoDY-MocWlcation of Allow~~l 
An order refusing modification of an interlocutory divorce1 
decree awarding the wife nominal alimony will not be af-; 
firmed on the ground of avoidance of a multiplicity of suits' 
in that" any amounts which wife might receive if decree were 
modified would be in breach of a property settlement agree-, 
ment, where wife attacked provision of agreement relating i 
to alimony in her complaint, and the court, by granting her i 
the alimony prayed for, determined that such provision was! 
not binding on her. : 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los' 
Angeles County denying motion for modification of an inter-. 
locutory judgment. Mildred L. Lillie, Judge. Reversed. ' 
{3] See 5 Cal.lv. 10-Yr.Supp. (1944 Rev.), Divorce and Sep-
aration, § 167 et seq. 
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Erb, French & Picone and John L. Stennett for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On January 21, 1947, plaintiff secured an 
interlocutory decree of divorce from defendant by default 
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The parties had previously 
executed a property settlement agreement in which plaintiff 
waived all. right to any payments for support and mainte-
nance. She alleged in her complaint that "the parties have 
heretofore concluded a property settlement agreement, which 
plaintiff confirms and asks the Court to approve,ave and 
excepting any· provision therein respecting payment of ali-
mony. She is asking that an award of at least token alimony 
be made at this time." She prayed "for 8 judgment' of 
divorce against the defendant; that the custody of the minor 
child of the parties be awarded to her; that the property 
settlement be confirmed, excepting provision for alimony; 
that she be awarded nominal alimony, and that she have 
such other and further relief as may be . equitable." The 
interlocutory decree provided in part that "the property 
settlement agreement 1D.ed herein is hereby approved . and 
the defendant is ordered and directed to carry out the terms 
thereof," and "IT Is FuRTHER ORDERED that the defendant 
pay to plaintiff the sum of $1.00 per month for her support 
commencing February 1, 1947, and continue each month 
thereafter until further order of Court." In November, 
1951, plaintiff sought to have the support award increased 
to $100 per month on the ground of changed circumstances. 
The trial court refused to bear any evidence on the issue of 
changed circumstances and entered its i)rder refusing modi-
fication of the interlocutory decree on the ground that the 
decree approved the property settlement agreement contain-
ing a provision waiving alimony. Plaintiff has appealed.' 
She contends that the interlocutory decree clearly provided 
for an award of alimony and that under Civil Code section 
189 the trial court has jurisdiction to modify that award. 
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the property 
settlement agreement, having been approved in the inter-
locutory decree, now stands in the way of any award in-
consistent with its terms. 
[1] Although the interlocutory decree purports to approve 
the property settlement agreement in its entirety, it is clear 
when it is read in the light of the complaint that it did not 
) 
.,' 
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do so. Plaintiff expressly requested that approval be 'With:~ 
held from the provision waiving support and prayed t'iu~'t~ 
nominal alimony be awarded. Such an award was made"and 
accordingly, the decree may only be interpreted as approving 
that part of the agreement dividing the property and 110t, 
as approving the waiver of alimony. '!~ 
Relying on .Adams v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621 [177 p .. 2d 
265], defendant contends that the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to modify the property settlement agreement.by 
providing for relief inconsistent with its terms. In that case,' 
on an appeal from 'a decree similar to the one here, we 1IIia;:j 
"It is true that public policy requires the protection ~lbf) 
the wife and that in a divorce action the court in itsdis.;~ 
" ~. 
cretion may award her necessary alimony. (Civ. Code, § 189.~;~ 
Such discretion, however, does not empower the trial couitt 
to modify valid agreements of the parties pertaining to th~, 
division of their property. The court cannot, as was attempted '. 
in the present case, purport to approve the agreement and' 
at the same time order payment of support and maintenanCe • 
contrary to its terms." (29 Ca1.2d at 627.) Since in that-o 
case the plaintiff made no showing that the agreement was: 
inequitable or obtained by improper means, it was held that' 
the agreement was binding on the parties and the court.', 
[2] In the present case, however, defendant did not appeal :' 
from the interlocutory decree. That decree is now 'final, and, 
in this proceeding defendant seeks collaterally to attack the,: 
provision awarding alimony. Accordingly, we are not contt 
cerned with whether the court erred in granting relief bl~ 
consistent with the property settlement agreement but onti 
with whether it had jurisdiction to do so. . 'I:' , 
[3] When the property rights of the parties are putii1. 
iSsue, the court in a divorce action has jurisdiction to deter~ '.' 
mine them. (Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 793 [167 P.2d 
7081.) [4] Similarly, it has jurisdiction to determine whether 
a property settlement agreement is equitable and should bel 
enforced (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 628), 1 
and to award alimony in a proper case. (Civ. Code, § 139.) ., 
[5] A~l of these questions were raised by the pleadings in 
this case, and the relief granted was in accord with the 
prayer of the complaint. By asking that approv~ be withheld 
from the provision of the agreement respecting alimony, 
plaintiff in effect attacked the validity of that agreement. 
On the other hand, her request that the remaining provisions 
be approved was tantamount to a claim. that she was entitled 
in any event to the property the agreement provided she 
./ 
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should have. In addition, by praying for nominal alimony, 
she in effect asked the court to exercise its power to reserve 
jurisdiction to award substantial alimony in the future if 
changed circumstances should justify .such an award. (See, 
McClure v. McClure, 4 Cal.2d 356, 359 [49 P.2d 584, 100 
A.L.R. 1257]; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 841 [136 
P.2d 1] ; Wilson v. SuperiorOourt, 31 Cal.2d 458, 464 [189 
P.2d 266] ; Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 69 Cal.App.2d 723, 727·728 
[160 P.2d 177] ; Soule v. Soule, 4 Cal.App. 97, 101 [87 P. 
205].) 
It may be conceded that she did not allege sufficient facts 
to show the:invalidity of the agreement, or to show that re-
gardless of its terms, she was entitled to the award of the 
property she received. [8] The failure of a complaint to 
state a cause of action, however, does not render a default 
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack. It is sufficient if 
it apprises the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's 
demand. (Trans.Pacific T. Co. v. Patsy F. cf B. Co., 189 
Cal. 509, 513-514 [209 P. 357]; Christerson v. French, 180 
Cal. 523, 525 [182 P. 27]; In re James, 99 Cal. 374, 376·377 
[33 P. 1122, 37 Am.St.Rep. 60] ; 81.'etina v. Burelli, 87 Cal. 
App.2d 707, 709 [197 P.2d 562] ; Henderson v. Henderson, 
85 Cal.App.2d 476, 479 [193 P.2d 135]; see, also, Wells 
Fargo cf 00. v. City etc. of San Prancisco, 25 Ca1.2d 37, 40, 
43, 44 [152 P.2d 625] ; Estate of Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328, 335 
[100 P.2d 1045].) Plaintiff's complaint met this test. 
[7] Defendant finally contends that the order refusing 
modification should be affirmed to avoid mUltiplicity of suits. 
He argues that any amounts plaintiff might receive if the 
decree were modified would be in breach of their agreement, 
and that accordingly, he could recover them back as damages 
from plaintiff. This argument assumes the validity of the 
provision of the separation agreement waiving alimony. As 
pointed out above, however, plaintiff attacked that provision 
in her complaint, and the court, by granting her the alimony 
prayed for, determined that it was not binding upon her. 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that. the token alimony provision of $1.00 
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-of section 139 of the Civil Code. That section provides that 
"Where a divorce is granted for an otfense of. the husband, 
the court may compel him to provide for the maWetIGnce ' 
of tke children of the marriage, GM to make such. suilcib18 
tJUowance to the wife for her support, • • • having regard to 
the circumstances of the parties respectively ..•. " (Em. 
phasis added.) By no stretch of the imagination can it be 
said that the sum of $1.00 per month could be sufficient 
for the maintenance of the minor child here, or for the 
support of the wife . .Alimony is granted for the express 
purpose of enabling the wife to maintain the children and 
support herself (Civ. Code, § 139). ·It is, therefore, in :& 
ditferent category than the $1.00 nominal consideration found ' 
in contracts and deeds to property. The legal etfect is also. ' 
entirely ditferent. The legal etfect of an alimony provision 
in a decree of divorce gives the trial court continuing juris-
diction to modify the sum awarded as the need of the one 
to whom the alimony w~ awarded increases or decreases, 
or the ability of the one paying the' alimony changes. It is 
most apparent here that the sum of $1.00 per month was 
not sufficient to support anyone and that there is quite a 
ditference between $1.00 and the $100 per month which the 
trial court is being asked now to allow the wife. It occurs 
to me that if the majority opinion is sound, had the trial 
court made a provision for one cent a month alimony the 
wife could later request that the one cent be increased to " 
$1,000 or $10,000 per month depending upon her ability to ' 
show that the defendant had, by some means, come into a' 
large sum of money because, under the conditions prevailing ~ 
here, it would not be necessary for her to show that her eondi., .~ 
tion had changed Since it cannot possibly be said that one '1 
cent, or one dollar per month had etler been adequate support . 
for her. (Becker v. Becker, 64 Cal.App.2d 239 [148 P.2d 
381] ; 18 A.L.R.2d 10, 85 et seq.) To contend, seriously, that' , 
the provision for payment of $1.00 per month alimony was ' 
intended as support for the wife is absurd and ridiculous. 
Not only that, but in view of the express provision in the 
property settlement agreement whereby the wife waived all 
right to alimony, the $1.00 token alimony provision in the 
decree has the etfect of perpetrating a fraud on the husband 
who, at the time, was not represented by counsel. The oNy 
purpose in inserting the provision for token alimony was to 
enable the trial court to retain jurisdiction and, in view of 
the waiver provision, is a fraud upon the husband. 
/ 
) 
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In my opinion, the majority holding in this case is in con:ftict 
with Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265]. We 
said there (p.625) "The third category includes contracts in 
which the wife waives all support and maintenance, or all 
support and maintenance except as provided in the agree-
tn('nt, in consideration of receiving a more favorable division 
of the community property. The court oomtot add a pr01Ji8io'n 
for alimony to such contracts without changing basically the 
agreement of the parties as to the divisio-n of their property. 
We are confronted with sUM a Bituation. in.lhe presem case. 
Plaintiff contends that the . trial court did not make a new 
property settlement agreement for the parties but approved 
the agreement ezcept for the prOtlisio-n tn which she waived aU 
support an.d mainten.ance . ... The contract before the trial 
court in the present case was clearly one that attempted to 
settle the property rights of the parties. It contained a waiver 
of all other payments in consideration of her receipt of the 
major portion of the community property, and that waiver 
was inseparable from the remainder of the division of prop-
erty. A waiver under such conditions is not void per se." 
(Emphasis added.) It was further held that "It is true that 
public policy requires the protection of the wife and that in 
a divorce action the court in its discretion may award her 
necessary alimony. (Civ. Code, § 139.) Such discretion, how-
ever, does Mt empower Ike lrial courl 10 modify tlalid agree-
flt-ents of tke parties perl_ng 10 Ihe GiMon. of lkeir prop-
erty. The court can.Mt, as tDa$ attempted in. lhe presen.1 case, 
purport to approve Ihe agreemen.1 cmd at Ihe same time order 
payment of support aM tnain-teMftCB con.trary to ils terms." 
(Emphasis added.) We concluded that since nothing was shown 
to indicate that the agreement entered into between the parties 
was inequitable the parties are bound by the agreement. It is 
conceded in the majority opinion that plaintiff did not attack 
the terms of the property settlement as inequitable and there 
was no finding to that effect. There was not even a finding 
that the terms thereof waiving alimony was disapproved. It 
appears to me that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award 
alimony in the face of the clear provision which it approved 
in the property settlement agreement waiving it. In the Adams 
ease, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 621, we said the trial court was not 
empowered to modify valid agreements of the parties. 
What does that mean except that the trial court does not 
have jurisdiction to do so, Or are we to use the word C C juris-
diction" in one case and the word C C empower" in another and 
) 
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leave the attorneys to guess just what we do mean f That it ' 
is a guess is apparent from the briefs in this case because the 
plaintiff conceded that the opinion of the District Court of 
Appeals ·(Cal.App.) 248 P.2d 777 which affirmed the trial 
court is correct" If the Adams case holds that a judgment ren-
dered contrary to the rule [set forth above J is void or in excess 
of its jurisdiction" but that "If this court by the Adams and 
subsequent cases merely intended to say that a judgment 
awarding alimony contrary to the Adams case is 8ubject .~ . 
attack on a motion for.a new trial or by appeal then the DUt-: 
trict Court of Appeal is in error." (Emphasis added.) The 'j 
majority of this court now adds to the confusion in hol~ '.:' 
that the plaintiff really meant to attack that portion of the " 
agreement waiving alimony and that she requested the balance'; 
thereof to be approved and "In addition she asked tOl::~ 
alimony." As I have heretofore pointed out, the sum of $l.QO ' 
per month cannot reasonably be said to constitute alimony; 
within the meaning of the code section (Civ. Code, § 139) and ' 
was only inserted in the decree so that continuing jurisdiction " 
might be retained by the trial court. In so doing, the trial court . 
perpetrated a fraud upon the husband in which the majority·: 
of this court now joins. " 'j" 
The holding of the majority here is also contrary to tb,e 
decision of this court in Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520 [196,: 
P.2d 9091 in which this court held that where a property' 
settlement agreement declaring that the wife releases the hUs- ~ 
band from "all claims whatsoever" for support or attorney'.! 
.fees has been determined to be valid in a prior action, '~'1' 
trial court in a divorce action has no power to make an awarcl" 
of alimony pendente lite and suit money contrary to tbf,', 
provisions of such agreement. Here there is no question as to 
the validity of the agreement as it was prepared by the wife'.'. 
attorney. She submitted it for the approval of the court at! 
the trial of her divorce action and the same was approved by , 
the court at her request. I can see no distinction in the legal 
problem involved in the two cases. In the Patton case this 
court held that in a case where by a valid property settle-
ment agreement, the wife waived all claim to alimony, the 
court had no power to make an award of alimony to her in a 
subsequent action for divorce. Here there can be no question in 
regard to the validity of the agreement. At least its validity is 
not questioned by the wife, and since it was approved by the 
• A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on December 4, 1952. 
) 
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trial court in a divorce action, its validity is b~yond question. 
Therefore, in the language of the Patton case the court had 
uno power" to make an award of alimony in her favor. If the 
court had "no power" to make an award of alb:nony in her 
favor, the spurious award of $1.00 in the interlocutory decree 
was obviously void. 
Furthermore, it should follow that if the court had no 
power to make an award of alimony in . favor of the wife be-
cause of the valid property settlement agreement in which she 
waived all her claim for support, it would then have been 
an idle act for the trial court to take evidence in support of 
her application for an increase in the amount of alimony 
awarded. her by .the interlocutory decree, .as. the court was 
likewise powerless to increase an award which it originally 
had no power to make. Therefore, even if we concede that 
the award of $1.00 per month alimony to the wife was mere 
error and not jurisdictional (which I do not) the trial court 
was certainly not required to take up the time of the court 
listening to evidence of changed conditions when it knew in 
advance that it was powerless to grant the relief demanded. 
I would therefore affirm the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I think that we should abide by the au-
thorities cited by Justice Carter. It seems to me that it is 
neither logic~l nor legally sound nor otherwise becoming for 
this court to give the dignity of its support to what appears 
to be essentially a subterfuge whereby a contract-the terms 
of which admittedly the court could not alter-is held to have 
been both approved and disapproved; and whereby, further, 
it is held in effect that a party to a court-approved contract 
may take all 'the benefits ~thereof.keep them, and continue 
to receive them, but disavow at will the obligations which 
constituted the consideration for making the contract in the 
first place. . . 
I, too, would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
